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1. Introduction 
 
After the break-up of the Yugoslav federation in 1991, there has been a 
substantial divergence in the transition paths of its successor states. The present 
paper considers the case of Serbia, the largest of the newly created countries, where 
until fairly recently the transition to market economy has been substantially delayed. 
In what follows, the most important political events of the 1990s will be recalled and 
their impact on macroeconomic performance and economic reforms in Serbia during 
the first decade of transition (section 2). The more recent economic reforms 
implemented by the post-Milosevic governments after October 2000 are then 
discussed (section 3). Taking into account the overall results of transition, an 
assessment is made of the present systemic features of the Serbian economy (section 
4). A few concluding remarks are given at the end (section 5). Although the focus is 
on Serbia, the analysis also refers to the Federal Republic (FR) of Yugoslavia, and 
after 2003 to Serbia and Montenegro, the country Serbia belonged to until June 
2006.2 Kosovo, although in June 2007 still officially part of Serbia, is explicitly 
excluded from the analysis.3 
 
2. Delayed transition during the 1990s 
 
The transition to market economy and multiparty democracy in SFR 
Yugoslavia, including Serbia, also started in 1989.4 In December 1989 the federal 
government implemented a bold macroeconomic stabilization program and launched 
the first privatization law, while the first multiparty elections were held in all 
republics soon after, in Serbia in December 1990. The transition was, however, 
interrupted by the severe political crisis and the break-up of the country in June 1991. 
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 FR Yugoslavia, constituted in April 1992, consisted of Serbia with its two 
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 It could be argued that transition to market economy in Serbia/SFR Yugoslavia 
started much earlier, but two fundamental changes marked a radical break with the 
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December 1989, and the first free multiparty elections held soon after in all Yugoslav 
republics.  
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Thereafter, a number of essentially political events have had very negative 
implications for most of its successor states, including Serbia. The disintegration of 
the Yugoslav federation was accompanied by the break-up of its economic and 
monetary union, loss of markets and of a common currency, four military conflicts in 
which Serbia/FR Yugoslavia has been directly or indirectly involved,5 nationalistic 
policies which gave priority to political over economic objectives, high costs of 
maintaining almost one million refugees from Bosnia and Croatia, and substantial 
delays in political reforms which postponed effective democratization and the 
establishment of a functional state. On the international front, severe political and 
economic sanctions were imposed against FR Yugoslavia during most of the 1990s, 
culminating in the 11-weeks NATO bombardments in 1999. International sanctions 
interrupted not only normal trade flows and foreign direct investment (FDI), but also 
bank transfers, access to international financial markets, membership in international 
organizations, general inflow of information and free travel abroad, since airports 
were closed and visas introduced even by neighboring countries. Most of these 
events have had destabilizing effects for the whole Southeast European (SEE) region, 
but the implications for the Serbian economy have been particularly devastating. 
These events have also directly influenced the slow process of economic transition 
and integration of Serbia with the European Union (EU).  
Following the disintegration of SFR Yugoslavia in June 1991, in just a few 
years the economy of the new FR Yugoslavia virtually collapsed (Uvalic, 2001a). By 
the end of 1993, GDP had fallen to just 43 per cent of its 1989 level. Expansionary 
monetary and fiscal policies necessary to finance the war in 1992-93 led to one of the 
highest and longest hyperinflations ever recorded in world history - by the end of 
December 1993, an average annual rate of 116.5 trillion per cent. The 1994 
stabilization program of central bank governor Dragoslav Avramovic was very 
successful in halting hyperinflation (average inflation in 1994 was down to 3.3 per 
cent), introducing a convertible dinar, and reversing the trend of declining output, but 
these positive results were short-lived, essentially due to lack of systemic change. In 
the second half of the 1990s, despite economic recovery inflation again became 
double-digit, exports stagnated contributing to a rising current account deficit, and 
the black market exchange rate in 1997-98 remained six times the official rate. After 
the conflict in Kosovo in 1999, GDP declined by 18 per cent, industrial production 
by 21 per cent, and exports by as much as 50 per cent. Over the whole 1990-99 
period, foreign direct investment (FDI) amounted to just US$ 1 billion, almost 
entirely due to the only important privatization deal, the 1997 partial privatization of 
Serbian Telecom. 
Throughout the 1990s, very little progress has been achieved in reforming the 
economic system. There were attempts to re-launch some important reforms, such as 
privatization (see below), but there were also serious policy reversals in other areas 
and the return to practices long abandoned in SFR Yugoslavia. These included 
frequent price freezes, extreme protectionism in foreign trade (very high tariffs in 
combination with a complicated system of import quotas, licenses and various types 
of permits), foreign exchange rationing and the use of multiple exchange rates, 
applied on a discretionary, non-transparent and ad hoc basis, frequently in order to 
favor primarily the political and economic elite. During the years of sanctions, 
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employment security was even strengthened through a law explicitly prohibiting lay-
offs, thus postponing enterprise restructuring.  
Regarding the enterprise sector, contrary to all other successor states of SFR 
Yugoslavia (including Montenegro within FR Yugoslavia), where ‘social property’ 
was first re-nationalized in an attempt to clarify property rights and thus facilitate 
privatization, in its new 1992 Constitution Serbia maintained ‘social property’ as one 
of the four property forms (alongside private, mixed, and cooperative property). 
Despite two new privatization laws and abundant related legislation (1991, 1994, 
1996, 1997), since privatization was to be initiated voluntarily, by decision of the 
enterprise’s General Assembly, the larger part of enterprises (and of the economy) 
remained under the ambiguous ‘social property’ regime.6 There was no radical break 
with workers’ self-management, since ‘social property’ also implied the partial 
maintenance of workers’ management rights. Only a small number of firms in ‘social 
property’ (the most important ones) were re-nationalized and also excluded from 
privatization, in order to ensure government control over the strategically most 
important enterprises. These state-owned firms which under self-management were 
run relatively independently by workers and managers, came under the supervision 
and direct control of government ministries. Instead of abandoning state paternalism, 
there was a step backwards towards governance mechanisms abandoned more than 
half a century ago (Cerovic, 2000). Not surprisingly, by 2000 the contribution of the 
private sector to GDP was still less than 40 per cent. Only small-scale privatization 
had been partially implemented, mainly resulting in widespread ownership by 
insiders who frequently owned worthless shares (though there have been cases of 
successful insider-owned firms). Instead of breaking up large enterprises, economic 
power further concentrated in a handful of state-protected firms, for which soft 
budget constraints have been maintained through various direct and indirect 
privileges.  
A decade of political and economic instability and very selective application 
of transition has had far-reaching social consequences. Along with falling incomes 
and living standards, there was notable social differentiation with adverse effects on 
the distribution of income and wealth. Absolute poverty roughly doubled during the 
1990s. Social protection and health services rapidly deteriorated. The banking system 
was abused of for political purposes, in 1992 through the freezing of citizens’ foreign 
currency bank accounts, 7 and later through fraudulent financial pyramid schemes 
which deprived many Serbian citizens of their life-long savings (see Dinkic, 1995). 
Laws were arbitrarily implemented (if at all), with different criteria applied for the 
different segments of the economy, substantially weakening the rule of law. 
International sanctions created incentives for smuggling, illegal activities, organized 
crime and ‘war profiteering’ (Babic, 1999). New phenomena appeared in Serbia 
which could be characterized as elements of ‘wild’ capitalism (Uvalic, 2002). 
Parallel to the mass impoverishment of the larger part of the population, a new 
oligarchy was born recruited among directors of big factories and the closest political 
collaborators of President Milosevic. The political system was deeply corrupted and 
                                                 
6
 SFR Yugoslavia’s 1974 Constitution defined social property explicitly as no-one’s 
property, as property of the whole society. Enterprises were granted the right to use 
socially-owned resources, but not full property rights (Uvalic, 1992, pp. 60-1). 
7
 The problem of citizens’ foreign exchange savings frozen in 1992 has been 
addressed only after the 2000 political changes: a part was paid back to citizens in 
cash, whereas another part was converted into government bonds.  
 4
manipulated. The new oligarchs’ strong influence over state institutions entailed 
significant benefits: they were in charge of the rules of the game throughout the 
1990s, including foreign trade transactions which under sanctions secured enormous 
profits, and had used their position and various illegal and semi-legal channels to 
transfer capital to new private firms or personal bank accounts abroad. Many years of 
international isolation have contributed to the strength of the political elite, which has 
had a decade to entrench itself, forge new alliances (also with the underworld) and 
adapt to the post-1989 order (Kekic, 2000). Under sanctions, smuggling had also 
become the main source of earnings for many citizens, contributing to the flourishing 
of the informal economy. Various forms of criminality became common in everyday 
life, including robbery, kidnapping, murders and false suicides, of which the 
responsible have never been found. During the most difficult times when it was 
impossible to get a normal bank credit, the ‘new rich’ entrepreneurs were offering 
loans at weekly interest rates which were multiple the normal ones. A dramatic social 
differentiation of the Serbian society took place: a rapid decline in real incomes of 
the larger part of the population, parallel with the enrichment of a new and tiny social 
elite.  
The severe economic and social problems that accumulated during the 1990s 
were frequently presented by the Serbian government as proof that the transition had 
prevalently negative effects, in this way also serving to justify the choice of a 
‘gradualist’ strategy. In reality, vested interests of the political and economic elite 
prevented more radical economic and political reforms. The economic system for the 
most had changed little, or had regressed with respect to the model of market 
socialism that existed before 1989. The political system, though formally a multi-
party democracy, was dominated by the Socialist Party of Serbia (SPS), or rather by 
its President Slobodan Milosevic and his closest collaborators.8. 
 
3. Post-2000 reforms 
 
A radical change in the course of transition in Serbia came after the October 
2000 political changes which marked the end of the Milosevic regime. Over the last 
six years, the new policies have produced impressive results in many areas, though 
more limited progress in others.9  
One of the most urgent tasks of the Serbian/Yugoslav government in late 
2000 was macroeconomic stabilization, given that price liberalization, necessary in 
order to eliminate major price distortions, initially also led to a high average inflation 
rate - of over 90 per cent in 2001. Substantial disinflation was achieved thereafter, by 
2004 to a one-digit figure (see Table 1). Although average inflation in 2005 again 
jumped to 17 per cent (mainly due to higher oil and electricity prices and wage 
increases), in 2006 it is expected to decline to 12.7 per cent and further to 8 per cent 
in 2007. Tight monetary policy has contributed to a strong real appreciation of the 
dinar (2001-03) followed by exchange rate stability, and more recently again real 
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appreciation,10 introduction of current account convertibility and an impressive 
increase in foreign exchange reserves (US$ 11.7 billion by end-2006).   
Serbia recorded relatively high public deficits in 2001-03, but thereafter 
achieved a balanced budget or even surpluses, in 2006 estimated at 2.7% of GDP 
(Table 1). Radical fiscal reforms have included a major simplification of the tax 
system, the passage to gross wages for social contribution purposes, the introduction 
of value-added-tax, and measures to fight the informal economy (such as fines for 
the non-issuing of bills). Nevertheless, the structure and level of public expenditure 
has not changed much, in 2005 representing 43 per cent of GDP, but this is a 
problem common to other SEE countries (Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina have 
even higher public expenditure).  
Growth performance has been impressive throughout most of the 2000-6 
period (see Table 1). The real GDP growth rate was 4-5 per cent in 2000-02, it 
slowed down to 2.4 per cent in 2003, but was 9 per cent in 2004, 6 per cent in 2005-
06, and is likely to stay around high (over 6 per cent) also in 2007. The strong 
economic recovery, however, has been largely insufficient to compensate for the 
very substantial fall in output during the 1990s. Although most other SEE countries 
are in a similar situation (by 2004, only Albania had attained its 1989 GDP level), 
Serbia is by far in the worst situation, having by mid-2005 reached at most around 60 
per cent of its 1989 real GDP. In 2005, Serbia had a GDP per capita of US$ 3250 (at 
market exchange rates), therefore higher than Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and 
Macedonia; or at Purchasing Power Parity (PPP) of US$ 6540, somewhat higher only 
of Albania (Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU), December 2006; see Figure 8.1). 
Serbia’s present GDP per capita corresponds to about 30 per cent of the EU-25 
average.  
Recent strong economic recovery has not yet brought employment growth, on 
the contrary. Over 2001-05, the unemployment rate (based on labor force survey) has 
continued increasing, from 13.3 per cent to 21.8 per cent, the long-term 
unemployment rate has also increased from 9.0 per cent to 17.3 per cent, parallel 
with a decline in the employment rate from 59.7 per cent to 51 per cent respectively 
(Commission, 2006a). Though these high unemployment rates overestimate the 
effective number of jobless workers since many are still active in the informal 
economy, unemployment is a key economic problem and is likely to worsen with 
further enterprise restructuring and privatization. Recent government measures have 
been largely unsuccessful in reversing these trends. 
Serbia’s external sector is also characterized by serious imbalances. The 
trade deficit has reached historical records, 25 per cent of GDP in 2004, though 
slightly declining thereafter (to 22 per cent in 2006). Serbia’s exports have remained 
stagnant during the 1990s, but have roughly doubled in 2001-05, particularly to the 
EU facilitated by EU trade preferences granted in late 2000. However, the exports 
structure has not changed substantially, concentrated mainly in agricultural and low 
processed manufacturing products. The sluggish export performance is mainly due to 
the structural weaknesses of the economy, the limited restructuring and 
modernization of key industries which missed a whole decade of technological 
progress (though the strong real appreciation of the dinar has also hampered export 
growth). In 2002, exports were still dominated by state and socially owned 
enterprises, accounting for 45 per cent of total exports (World Bank, 2004, p. 55). 
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Serbia’s current account deficit is also at critical levels and among the highest 
in the SEE region, despite recent improvements (from 17 per cent of GDP in 2003 it 
has been reduced to 10.4 per cent in 2006; see Table1.). Substantial financial 
assistance from international donors during 2000-06 (more than  €2.5 billion only 
through the EU CARDS program) as well as workers remittances (10-12 per cent of 
GDP during 2001-03) have contributed to limiting the deficit. A large part of 
Serbia’s external debt to the Paris and London Club of creditors and Russia11 has 
been favorably written off, permitting the reduction of external debt to US$ 15 
billion by 2005 and of the debt/GDP ratio from 167 per cent in 2000 to 64 per cent in 
2005 (EBRD, 2006, p. 173).  
Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) has been steadily increasing particularly 
after 2003 (see below). By end-2005, FDI stock in Serbia amounted to US$ 5.9 
billion (24.4 per cent of GDP), but corresponding to just 1.5 per cent of total FDI 
stock in all 28 transition countries (EIU, September 2006). Record FDI inflows will 
be achieved in 2006, of around US$ 4 billion (EIU, December 2006). As elsewhere, 
the largest part of FDI has been secured through a few successful privatization deals 
in specific sectors (tobacco, base metals, and more recently banking and 
telecommunications).  
In addition to improved macroeconomic performance, substantial progress 
has been achieved in transition-related institutional reforms. Looking at EBRD 
transition indicators in late 2000, the only areas where some economic reforms had 
been implemented in Serbia were small-scale privatization and price liberalization 
(see Table 2.). Just a year later, the EBRD evaluated Serbia and Montenegro as ‘the 
fastest reformer’ among all 27 transition economies. Thereafter, many economic 
reforms have been carried forward successfully.  
Privatization has progressed according to a new 2001 law, based on cash-
based sales at tenders and auctions, which fundamentally changed the strategy away 
from the insiders' model used in the 1990s towards commercial sales. During the first 
four years of its application, some 1500 firms were privatized (out of 3000 envisaged 
for privatization) and small-scale privatization has been almost completed, though 
large-scale privatization has been delayed. The private sector share of GDP increased 
from less than 40 to 55 per cent during 2000-06, but fundamental problems remain in 
the enterprise sector. FDI has gone into a few best companies (by October 2004, only 
39 firms were sold at tenders), whereas in many privatized firms the change of 
ownership has left many problems unresolved, including poor corporate governance 
and lack of restructuring. In the still non-privatized part of the economy, there are 
more than a thousand socially-owned firms that have not found potential buyers 
(end-2006); some of these are heavily indebted loss-making firms, that since 2001 
have been waiting for a new bankruptcy law, adopted only in 2006. In addition, over 
70 socially-owned enterprises have been selected for a special restructuring program, 
but its implementation has also been delayed without justification. The strategically 
most important firms nationalized in the early 1990s, representing 35 per cent of 
Serbia’s capital, have started being privatized only in 2006-07 - such as the oil and 
gas company NIS or the Bor mining and smelting complex.12 These are among the 
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reasons why Serbia in 2006 still had a low 2+ EBRD score in governance and 
enterprise restructuring. 
A lot of progress has been achieved in both price and foreign trade 
liberalization. By 2005 the average tariff rate has been reduced to around 7 per cent, 
the tariff structure has been greatly simplified, and trade liberalization has been 
implemented within the SEE region.13 By contrast, very limited results have been 
achieved in competition policy (the EBRD score being the lowest of all, 2-). Only in 
September 2005 did a new competition law come into effect, while in May 2006 the 
Commission for protection of competition became operational. De-monopolization 
of the Serbian economy has been delayed, as many domestic state and socially-
owned enterprises continue to be sheltered from competition from abroad through 
non-tariff barriers, or face soft-budget constraints and are often in a better position 
than private firms regarding access to bank credit or tax relief. Budget subsidies to 
large loss-making firms have remained among the highest in the SEE region, around 
3.7 per cent of GDP; in 2003, according to a World Bank survey, some 12 per cent of 
Serbian firms perceived no competition on the local market (World Bank, 2004, p. 
34).  
As to financial reforms, a number of loss-making banks were closed at an 
early stage, including four of the largest banks representing 55 per cent of total assets 
of the banking sector. Though privatization of the banking sector was initially 
delayed, it speeded up after 2004 and by mid-2006, 18 foreign banks were operating 
in Serbia,14 foreign ownership already accounted for 77 per cent of banking assets, 
while the remaining assets were in the hands of 19 domestic banks, 12 of which were 
state-owned (Commission, 2006a; Zdrale, 2006). Despite increasing competition, the 
net interest spread, though declining, has remained high: 11 per cent in 2005, 
substantially higher than the SEE average of 7 per cent or the Central East European 
(CEE) average of 4 per cent (Commission, 2006a). Currency substitution is also 
relatively high, as foreign currency deposits account for around 70 per cent of total 
deposits. Due to delays in privatization, the capital market remains underdeveloped, 
dominated by state bonds on frozen foreign currency deposits. Although in mid-
2006, some 100 Serbian firms were quoted on the Belgrade stock exchange, traded 
annual stock amounted to only about € 500 million. Regarding non-financial 
institutions, the National Bank of Serbia has recently withdrew licenses of insurance 
companies not satisfying required standards.  
The business environment has also substantially improved. According to the 
World Bank Doing Business Survey, Serbia and Montenegro was the top reformer in 
2004, having been evaluated favorably in 8 of the 10 indicators (such as capital and 
time needed to start a new business, resolve commercial disputes, or labor 
legislation). In the 2006 Doing Business Survey, Serbia improved its relative position 
further in five of the ten indicators and ranked 1st among all six western Balkan 
countries, 13th among the 28 European and Central Asian countries (ahead of some 
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of the EU new member states such as Poland), and 68th in the aggregate ranking of 
175 countries, having been upgraded from the 95th position it occupied in 2005.  
Overall, impressive results have been achieved in most areas. Nevertheless, in 
mid-2006, with a 55 per cent contribution of the private sector to GDP, Serbia was 
still lagging behind the large majority of transition economies (all except five).15 The 
‘politically correct’ model of privatization was chosen in 2001 based on commercial 
sales, as suggested also by World Bank experts, justified by arguments of economic 
efficiency, rather than social justice which has guided previous privatizations (see 
Uvalic, 2004). It would have been wiser to have adopted a multi-track privatization 
strategy; as anticipated in 2001 (Uvalic, 2001b), many socially-owned enterprises 
have not found potential buyers and are likely to survive well beyond the set 
deadlines. These enterprises should have been closed during the initial phase or, as a 
socially more acceptable solution, could have been given freely to workers, in line 
with the long tradition of self-management. Even if this would have led to a number 
of insider-owned firms, this could have been, also in Serbia, a highly pragmatic 
means of effecting initial privatization. As in many other transition economies, 
employee ownership would most probably have been a transitory form of 
organization, eventually leading to a shift in ownership from insiders to outsiders 
(Nuti, 1997, p. 179).  
There are also other complementary areas of reform which could have 
facilitated faster progress in the real sector of the economy had they been 
implemented earlier, such as bankruptcy legislation, the general hardening of budget 
constraints, breaking up monopolistic structures, promoting competition, more 
substantial support of new private firms, radical reforms of the judiciary as to ensure 
the rule of law, better governance mechanisms and protection of property rights – in 
line with the ‘New Washington Consensus’ (Kolodko and Nuti, 1997). These 
conditions on their own could have delivered many of the advantages expected of 
privatization (Uvalic and Nuti, 2004, p. 13).  
 
4. Systemic features of the Serbian economy 
 
Given the overall results of market-oriented economic reforms implemented 
so far, how different is Serbia today with respect to other countries in transition? 
The more radical economic reforms implemented in Serbia over the last six 
years have permitted its transformation, among transition countries, from a laggard to 
a frontrunner. In many areas of reform Serbia has caught up the other countries, and 
has even surpassed some SEE (and many CIS) countries (see Table 2). Thus today 
there are no longer large differences between the results achieved in Serbia and other 
SEE (even some CEE) countries, particularly regarding price liberalization, the trade 
and foreign exchange system, small-scale privatization, or the business environment. 
In other fields progress has been much slower - enterprise governance and 
restructuring, development of securities markets and non-bank financial institutions, 
competition policy - but these are areas where fundamental changes have been much 
slower in other transition economies as well. 
Despite major similarities to other transition countries, Serbia still retains 
certain specific features which explain why its post-2000 transition has been quite 
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unique, much more complex than initially anticipated. It has been proposed (Uvalic, 
2007) that this is due to essentially two groups of factors: its different socialist 
legacy, and the turbulent 1990s. 
Socialist legacy: Has anything remained of Serbia’s 1989 specific economic 
features (see Uvalic, 1991)? The main advantage of a shorter reform agenda, thanks 
to reforms undertaken in the past, has mainly been lost, due to many reversals in 
economic policies during the 1990s away from a market economy. There is one 
advantage, latent during many years of isolation and sanctions, that has recently 
forcefully re-emerged, however: the rich experience accumulated during several 
decades of intense contacts with the West – of enterprises, commercial banks, 
government institutions, individuals – is today proving valuable for re-establishing 
relations worldwide at all levels.  
As to the disadvantages, one of the elements of the old economic system that 
has robustly survived these 17 years of transition in Serbia is ‘social property’. The 
same systemic feature that was a burden in 1991 – ill-defined property rights – has 
remained a burden today. Under socialism ‘social property’ could have been 
considered an advantage of Serbia/former Yugoslavia with respect to other socialist 
countries where enterprises were in state property, but after 1989 it has clearly 
become a disadvantage, since in many cases it has slowed down enterprise 
privatization and restructuring.  
Another disadvantage that characterized SFR Yugoslavia with respect to 
other CEE countries in 1989 was resistance to change, due to a higher degree of 
popular support of the existing regime. This disadvantage today may still be more 
present in Serbia than in many other transition countries, but for different reasons 
than those in 1989 (see below).  
Legacy of the 1990s: The transition in Serbia has proved to be rather complex 
not only because of the survival of pre-1989 economic features and the 
postponement of radical change for a whole decade, but because of the numerous 
problems which emerged after 1991. The 1990s was not simply a lost decade from 
the standpoint of transition (see Begovic and Mijatovic, 2005); it was a decade of 
particularly unfavorable overall conditions associated with wars, isolation, non-
democratic regime, hyperinflation and reversals in economic reform, which have left 
profound traces on all segments of Serbia’s society. The general conditions for re-
launching transition in Serbia in late 2000 were consequently far worse than those in 
1989 when the transition first started. More precisely, Serbia in late 2000 did not 
start its new phase of political and economic transformation from scratch, but with a 
heavy burden of the 1990s. The retrograde political and economic system set up in 
1991 and a decade of political and economic mismanagement have left many 
negative consequences, some of which are felt still today – in the behavior of the still 
non-privatized enterprises, in the criminal and semi-criminal networks that made up 
much of the Serbian economy in the 1990s and have proved very difficult to fully 
dismantle, in the highly non-transparent and still non-reformed public administration, 
in the insufficiently modernized judiciary, in workers’ mentality and their non-
acceptance that the days of self-management are over, in the use of traditional 
communist methods and often highly non-democratic political culture, in citizens’ 
mistrust of the government and of the transition.  
Though features of continuity with the old regime are not an exclusivity of 
Serbia – also in other post-communist countries discontinuities with the old regime 
have frequently been more apparent than real (Kekic, 2000) – in Serbia the element 
of continuity has probably been even stronger. Because of substantial delays in 
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radical economic and political reforms and the very negative heritage of the last 17 
years, these elements of continuity are proving more difficult to eradicate.  
This is closely related to the previously mentioned issue of resistance to 
change, which in Serbia today is present not simply because, as in many other 
countries, the losers from transition are still numerous. The reasons behind resistance 
to change in Serbia are much more complex. They include nostalgia - not only for 
the pre-1989 days, when the standard of living was apparently higher, employment 
more secure, pensions were paid regularly, travel abroad did not require burdensome 
visas and the country was respected worldwide - but also for some features of the 
1990s system, such as the possibility to earn an extra income in the informal 
economy which was still tolerated, or subsidies prices of electricity, bread and milk. 
Resistance to change derives from the unfulfilled expectations associated with false 
promises of nationalism, continuous manipulations of facts by the pre-2000 
government and the state-controlled television (if not all media), populist policies 
which for years have intentionally postponed the necessary adjustments, making 
today’s costs of transition in Serbia particularly high.  
Serbia's apparent ambivalence and slowness in embracing change is also a 
result of another key difference between Serbia and CEE countries with respect to 
the underlying drivers of transition and associated attitudes to the West. In the early 
1990s, the geopolitical and national interests in CEE coincided with those of political 
and economic transition, since anti-Russian and pro-European sentiment strongly 
facilitated the post-1989 changes. By contrast, in Serbia the international geopolitical 
changes ran counter to its national interests (in particular, the negative impact of the 
break-up of the country for Serb minorities outside Serbia), and Western policy 
(which culminated in NATO's bombing in 1999) has been seen by many in Serbia as 
fundamentally hostile to Serb interests (Kekic, 2000).  
Serbian citizens have lived a whole decade in international isolation, under 
sanctions and the veil of false promises of the Milosevic regime, in a world of 
unrealistic and irrational expectations. These are some of the factors which explain 
why a third of the voters in Serbia in January 2007 were still not ready to accept the 
new direction of change taken in late 2000, towards a capitalist market economy and 
full integration with the rest of Europe.  
Taking into account the changing nature of the Serbian economy and its 
institutions, today we find the coexistence of ingredients of at least four different 
economic systems:  
• Traditional socialism (soft-budget constraints, subsidies to loss-making firms, 
monopolistic practices); 
• Self-managed market socialism (‘social property’ of enterprises, protection of 
workers rights); 
• ‘Wild’ capitalism (inefficient judiciary, gaps in market regulation, insecure 
property rights, corruption); and 
• Hyper-liberal capitalism (fast trade liberalization, substantial downsizing of 
the welfare state, balanced budget).  
 
While these same elements were there in 2001 (Uvalic, 2002), what has 
changed in the meantime is their relative weight, as the capitalist components have 
gained importance. There is no doubt that today the dominant paradigm in Serbia is 
the liberal capitalist model. The remnants of the previous economic systems – the 
pre-1989 market socialist and the post-1989 socialist-capitalist system - are in the 
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process of being emarginated, although perhaps not as quickly as desired or 
expected, for all the reasons discussed earlier.  
 
5. Concluding remarks 
 
Although transition to market economy and multiparty democracy in Serbia 
has proved to be rather complex and in many ways unique, Serbia is more and more 
resembling other transition countries. Today it is an open market economy with 
dominant private ownership, it has liberalized its trade with the EU and with its 
neighbors, it has reformed many of its institutions, its financial sector is dominated 
by foreign-owned banks and there is an emerging stock exchange. Serbia is also the 
fastest growing economy in the SEE region, it has reached substantial 
macroeconomic stabilization, it has a stable (or slightly appreciating) internally 
convertible domestic currency, it has accumulated substantial foreign exchange 
reserves greatly minimizing the risk of external insolvency, privatization 
opportunities are still abound and FDI has been on the upward trend. 
What is most important, the radical turn towards a fully-fledged market 
economy taken in late 2000 can now be considered irreversible. Economic 
transformation has reached a critical mass which precludes serious policy reversals, 
since eventual political changes could influence the speed of transition, but not its 
generally positive direction. There are still numerous challenges, the most important 
being further increasing competitiveness on world markets through further 
privatization and more substantial enterprise restructuring and modernization, but the 
economic prospects today have greatly improved with respect to only five years ago.  
The more difficult challenges lie in the political domain. Although Serbia 
today has the status of a ‘potential EU candidate’, in May 2006 negotiations on a 
Stabilization and Association Agreement with the EU were interrupted due to the 
non-compliance with political criteria (essentially, the non-delivery of general 
Mladic). It is only recently, following the formation of the new democratic 
government in mid-May 2007, that there were signs that negotiations with the EU 
could resume soon. Considering that the very process of negotiations with the EU 
has recently been, also in Serbia, a very powerful engine of institutional change 
towards EU standards, Serbia should not be left without this important incentive for 
long. The other even more difficult issue is to find an acceptable solution for the 
status of Kosovo, which has been postponed for over seven years and is unlikely to 
be definitely resolved without further complicating the history and geography of the 
Balkans.16 It is to be hoped that the new Serbian government will be able to 
forcefully and coherently implement a pro-reform and pro-Europe agenda, so that the 
remaining political problems can also be resolved. This would allow Serbia to benefit 
from more permanent political stability, which would also clearly facilitate further 
progress in remaining economic reforms and economic integration with the EU. 
                                                 
16
 On February 2, 2007, an ambiguous ‘blueprint for a deal’ was laid out by the UN 
envoy for Kosovo Martti Ahtisaari without any mention of independence. The final 
status of Kosovo will have to be decided in a new UN Security Council Resolution, 
initially announced for March but thereafter postponed, in part due to the opposition 
of Russia. 
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Table 1 Serbia – Main macroeconomic indicators, 1999-06 
 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 
Inflation (average, %) 37.1 60.4 91.1 21.2 11.3 9.5 17.2 12.7 
Government balance 
(% of GDP) 
 
Na 
 
-1.0 
 
-4.9 
 
-8.3 
 
-3.4 
 
0.0 
 
0.9 
 
2.7 
Real GDP growth (%) -18.0 5.2 5.1 4.5 2.4 9.3 6.3 5.8 
Unemployment rate (% 
of labor force) 
 
14.5 
 
13.3 
 
13.3 
 
14.5 
 
16.0 
 
19.5 
 
21.8 
 
Na 
Current account 
balance (% of GDP) 
 
-4.4 
 
-5.1 
 
-5.0 
 
-17.5 
 
-16.4 
 
-14.8 
 
-10.0 
 
-10.4 
FDI inflows (mln US$) 112 25 165 475 1360 966 1550 4000 
Sources: EBRD (2006), except for: unemployment (Commission of the EU, 2006a); 
the 2006 inflation, GDP growth rate, and current account balance (Serbian Statistical 
Office, December 2006); and FDI (Economist Intelligence Unit, December 2006). 
 13
 
Table 2. EBRD transition indicators - Serbia (2000-06) and SEE (mid-2006) 
  Enterprises Markets and trade Financial 
institutions 
Serbia Private 
sector share 
of GDP 
(in%)  
mid-year 
Large-scale 
privatiz-
ation 
Small-scale 
privatization  
Govern-
ance and 
entreprise 
restructur-
ing 
Price 
liberalization 
Trade and 
foreign 
exchange 
system  
Competition 
policy  
Banking 
reform and 
interest rate 
liberalization 
Securities 
markets & 
non-bank 
financial 
institutions 
2000 40 1 3 1 2+ 1 1 1 1 
2001 40 1 3 1 4 2+ 1 1 1 
2002 45 2 3 2 4 3 1 2+ 2- 
2003 45 2+ 3 2 4 3 1 2+ 2 
2004 50 2+ 3+ 2 4 3 1 2+ 2 
2005 55 3- 3+ 2+ 4 3+ 1 3- 2 
2006 55 3- 4- 2+ 4 3+ 2- 3- 2 
SEE 2006 
Albania 75 3 4 2+ 4+ 4+ 2 3- 2- 
B&H 55 3- 3 2 4 4- 2- 3- 2- 
Croatia 60 3+ 4+ 3 4 4+ 2+ 4 3 
Macedonia 65 3+ 4 3- 4+ 4+ 2 3- 2+ 
Montenegr 65 3+ 3 2 4 3+ 1 3- 2- 
Serbia 55 3- 4- 2+ 4 3+ 2- 3- 2 
Source: EBRD, Transition report 2006. 
 14
Figure 1. GDP per head in Southeast Europe, 2005 (in US dollars) 
 
Source: Economic Intelligence Unit, December 2006, p. 4. 
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